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Judicial Regulation of the Motion-Picture Industry:
The Paramount Case
The motion-picture industry has been the subject of litigation under
the Sherman Act throughout the entire course of its development as a
major American industry.1 Coming to full growth with the advent of
the talking picture, the industry developed abuses which led to a full scale
attack upon it in 1938. This attack culminated in a consent decree in
1940,2 but due largely to the failure of three defendants to consent to
the entry of the decree against them, this solution proved ineffective. In
1945 the Anti-Trust Division initiated further action to force a reorgani-
zation of the industry; in June 1946 the statutory court 2 declared the
pattern of distribution to be in restraint of competition. At the very end
of 1946 a decree was entered to regulate the industry and eliminate offen-
sive practices in motion picture distribution.
4
THE PATTERN OF THE INDUSTRY
The motion picture industry is organized on the three levels of pro-
duction, distribution, and exhibition. There are eight major corporations
controlling the production and distribution levels, the defendants of the
Paramount case., The exhibition level is divided among the many op-
erators of single independent theatres, operators of independent chains,
operators of chains affiliated with the Big Five and theatres operated di-
rectly by the Big Five.6 The exhibition level is controlled to some ex-
I. Whitman, Anti-Trust Cases Affecting the Distribution of Motion Pictures
(1938) 7 FoRDHAu L. Rxv. i89; Note (1938) 36 CoL. L. REV. 635.
2. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Civil Action No. 87-273 (S. D. N. Y.
1938), C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. (8th ed. i94o) 25,558. See Nizer, Duty to Bar-
gain in the Motion Picture Industry (1g43) 43 Col. L. REV. 7o5; Note (1941) 50
YALE L. J. 854; Note (1942) 5I YALE L. J. 1175.
3. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 66 F. Supp. 323 (S. D. N. Y. 1946).
4. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Civil Action No. 87-273 (S. D. N. Y.
1946), C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. (gth Ed. 1947) 57,526.
5. The Big Five (Paramount Pictures, Inc., Loew's, Inc., Radio-Keith-Orpheum
Corp., Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc., and Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.),
together accounted for more than tvo-thirds of all film rentals before the war: Loew's
I8%; 2oth Century-Fox I4%; Paramount 14%; Warner's 14%; RKO 9%. The Big
Five are engaged in activities on all three levels of the industry. The Little
Three, Columbia Pictures Corp., Universal-International, and United Artists Corp.,
each accounted for about 7% of the film rentals. Columbia and Universal are engaged
in both production and distribution. United Artists does not produce, but distributes
for its member producers. The Little Three have no theatre holdings. 31 FORTUNE
No. 2, Feb. 1945, 208. There are numerous other minor producing organizations, most
of which distribute through the eight major companies. And there are several other
minor companies which both produce and distribute.
6. "In the year 1945 there were about I8,O76 motion picture theatres in the United
States of which the five major defendants had interests in 3,137 or 17.35%. Of the
latter, Paramount or its subsidiaries owned independently of the other defendants 1,395
-a little less than half . . .; Warner's 5oi; Loew's 135; Fox 636; RKO 1O9 ...
There were 361 theatres, or about 2%, in which two or more of these defendants had
joint interests." See note 3 supra at 352. It should be noted that these holdings, with
a few exceptions, are not in competition with other Big Five holdings. United States
v. Paramount Pictures, Civil Action No. 87-273 (S. D. N. Y. 1946), Plaintiff's Brief,
pp. 138-185. Moreover, in general, the Big Five theatres are the large first-run houses
which account for the larger part of film revenues.
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tent by pooling agreements among Big Five exhibitors and independent
operators. Similar agreements have been employed by independent chains.
Pooling agreements provide for the joint operation of key theatres within
a competitive area, for restrictions upon the use of other theatre property
in the area, or for restrictions upon the acquisition of new theatres un-
less offered to the pool. The agreements are maintained by various legal
devices, including operating agreements, leases, joint stock ownership
of theatre-operating corporations, and actual joint ownership in fee.7
Price-Fixing: Motion picture film is not sold outright, but exhibition
rights are licensed on a specific run." The better films are licensed on
a percentage of the box office receipts, rather than at a flat fee. The
percentage may be on a sliding scale, or subject to other qualifications
designed to produce a maximum return to the distributor. The usual
license contains a provision forbidding the exhibition of the licensed film
at an admission price below a specified minimum, thus guaranteeing that
the distributor's percentage will operate on a satisfactory base. In addi-
tion it assures the distributor, and the exhibitor of a prior run of the
same film, that the picture will not be subsequently shown at a price that
would compete with the prior run. Admission prices are thus fixed to
provide a minimum of competition between the succeeding runs of a
film.
The Big Eight contend that under the Copyright Act they are en-
titled to fix whatever price seems expedient for the exhibition of their
copyrighted product, particularly since each picture at the distributor
fixed price would be in competition with the product of competitor dis-
tributors at competitor fixed prices. This argument might bear analysis
were it not for the fact that all of the distributors fixed upon substantially
the same price in licensing films to a particular theatre, thereby effec-
tively preventing price competition. Moreover, the copyright does not
grant immunity from the operation of the anti-trust laws,9 and should not
legalize practices in restraint of competition.
The distributors also argue that they do not fix the admission price,
but merely take the standard price charged by the exhibitor. It cannot
be denied, however, that price has been the primary consideration in de-
ciding whether to license a particular theatre, and regardless of the
basis upon which the license price has been determined, a uniform price
structure has resulted. It is maintained by the provisions of the license
agreements, from which the exhibitor cannot deviate without losing what-
ever position he may have within the pattern.1 ° But although the dis-
tributor-fixed admission price is conditioned upon the feature film, the
feature film is only a part of the service purchased by the public. Other
screen entertainment and services, such as comfortable seating and air-
conditioning (none of which fall within the distributor's copyright), are
included in the theatre admission price.
The price-fixing pattern is at its worst in the exhibition relationships
of the Big Five distributor-exhibitors. Films of one are shown in the
theatres of another on terms that make them virtual partners in the exhibi-
7. See note 3 siepra at 350-352.
8. "Runs-The successive exhibitions of a motion picture in a given area, first-
run being the first exhibition in that area, second-run being the next subsequent, and
so on." See note 3 su ra at 333.
9. Interstate Circuit v. United States, 3o6 U. S. 208 (i939) ; Strauss v. American
Publisher's Ass'n., 231 U. S. 222 (I913).
Io. See note 3 supra at 335.
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tion of the film. This is true of all percentage licensing, but it is particularly
flagrant in the licensing of films in the first-run theatres of the Big
Five and in the franchises, 11 formula deals,
12 and master agreements 13
which are employed to give an advantage to favored exhibitors.'
4 The
entire pattern is designed to protect the returns from these major first-run
theatres.
Clearance and Run: To protect the exhibitor against a competitive
run of the same film, perhaps at a lower price than that specified in the
exhibitor's license, a clearance provision 15 is included in the license, guar-
anteeing that the licensed film will not be shown in the competitive area
before the expiration of a stated period. This clearance provision speci-
fies a minimum admission price below which subsequent runs will not be
licensed to competitive theatres after the termination of the clearance period.
Price-fixing has thus been accomplished by the clearance pattern; but this
is only one result of clearance.
Because all theatres within the competitive area are affected by the
clearance provisions of thee first-run licenses, and all subsequent theatres
are similarly affected by second-run licenses, etc., each theatre comes to
be restricted to a specified run within the pattern.'
6 That this stratifi-
cation developed originally as a result of similar individual experiences of
the individual distributors dealing within the same competitive situation,
rather than as a result of combination among them, does not change the
result. The structure crystalized in either event, and exhibitors are thereby
prevented from engaging in free competition, and from freely improving
their position in that competition. -
This pattern has not been established with regard to the competitive
efficiency of theatres, but on the basis of the self-interest of the distributors
who may prefer certain theatres as first-run and then assign the remain-
ing houses to a specific subsequent run within the clearance structure.
As a result, clearance and priority of run have been the greatest single
cause of exhibitor dissatisfaction under the present distribution pattern.,
ii. "Franchise-a licensing agreement, or series of licensing agreements, entered
into as a part of the same transaction, in effect for more than one motion picture sea-
son and covering the exhibition of pictures released by one distributor during the entire
period of the agreement." See note 3 supra at 333.
12. "Formula Deal-A licensing agreement with a circuit of theatres in which
the rental price of a given film is measured for the circuit as a whole by a specified
percentage of the picture's national gross." Ibid.
13. "Master Agreement-A licensing agreement, also known as a 'blanket-deal',
covering the exhibition of films in a number of theatres, usually comprising a cir-
cuit." Ibid.
14. Id. at 339.
15. "Clearance-The period of time, usually stipulated in the license contracts,
which must elapse between runs of the same picture within a particular area or in
specified theatres." Id. at 333.
16. The competitive area within which each theatre operates thus comes to be a
zone within which clearance is granted in favor of that theatre. Exhibitors may find
that they are inhibited as much by being confined to a particular zone, as they are by
the pattern within the zone. In Gary Theatre v. Columbia, 12o F. (2d) 891 (C. C. A.
7th, 1941) relief was denied to an exhibitor in Gary, Indiana, whose theatre was zoned
within the Chicago clearance area although it was also in competition with theatres in
Indiana outside the Chicago zone and thereby able to obtain better runs.
17. Bigelow v. RKO, i5o F. (2d) 877 (C. C. A. 7th, 1945); Gary Theatre v.
Columbia, i2o F. (2d) 89i (C. C. A. 7th, 1941); Youngclaus v. Omaha Film Board
of Trade, 6o F. (2d) 538 (D. Neb. 1932).
18. In three years of arbitration under the 1940 consent decree cases involving
clearance and run have been the leading causes of friction. BusiNESs WEmx, Jan. 8,
1944, Pp. 74-75.
Although such stratification prefers one theatre over another, and re-
duces to a minimum the competition between the theatres within the zone,
nevertheless courts have generally considered ordinary clearance terms to
be a reasonable restraint, 9 and in particular situations where they have
found specific clearance terms illegal they have not attacked clearance
itself.
20
Sometimes theatre operators have been unable to obtain any run for
their theatres 21 because franchise agreements or other devices are used to
preempt all available product. The threat of this kind of discrimination has
been used to control independent exhibitors and to prevent the entry of new
competition.
Block-Booking: Discrimination by over-buying 2 2 through block-
booking 23 has been recognized by the courts as a restraint of trade,
24
but block-booking as a distribution method was upheld in a decision of
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 1932.25 The practice is de-
fended by exhibitors who want the privilege of purchasing their seasonal re-
quirements in advance, but who also desire cancellation privileges to permit
the license to be modified as to unsuitable films. The 194o consent decree
specified that films could be sold in maximum groups of five, and avoided
the disadvantages of blind-selling 26 by requiring a trade showing prior
to the licensing of the block. This procedure was continued by dis-
tributors despite the lapse of the decree. It avoided the dangers of over-
buying, but destroyed the seasonal security of the exhibitor without in-
creasing his discretionary power to reject poor films, for the block could
be rigged to include several undesired films which would have to be
licensed by the exhibitor in order to get the desired films in the block.2
THE PARAMOUNT DEcim
The decree of the Paramount case,28 entered December 31st, 1946,
varies but slightly from the provisions announced in the decision of the
ig. Gary Theatre v. Columbia, 12o F. (2d) 891 (C. C. A. 7th, 194); Westway
Theatre, Inc. v. 2oth Century-Fox, 3o F. Supp. 83o (D. Md. 194o), aff'd, 113 F. (2d)
932 (C. C. A. 4th, I94O). See also note 3 supra at 341.
20. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173 (944) ; Bigelow v.
RKO, I5o F. (2d) 877 (C. C. A. 7th, 1945); Youngclaus v. Omaha Film Board of
Trade, 6o F. (2d) 538 (D. Neb. i932); United States v. Schine Chain, 63 F. Supp.
229 (W. D. N. Y. I945).
21. See Goldman v. Loew's, I5O F. (2d) 738 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1945).
22. Over-buying is the practice of leasing at one time more pictures for a period
of time-formerly for a year-than are needed or can be used, thus depriving com-
petitors of this particular source of film product.
23. "Block-Booldng-The practice of licensing, or offering for license, one fea-
ture, or group of features, upon condition that the exhibitor shall also license another
feature, or group of features, released by the distributor during a given period." See
note 3 stpra at 333.
24. White Bear Theatre Corp. v. State Theatre Corp., 129 F. (2d) 6oo (C. C. A.
8th, 1942).
25. Federal Trade Commission v. Paramount Famous-Lasky Corp., 57 F. (2d)
152 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
26. Blind-selling is the practice, usually combined with block-booking, of licensing
films before they have been offered to the exhibitor for inspection. They may be
offered merely by title, or by the names of the featured players in the films so licensed.
27. See Note (942) 5I YALE L. J. 1175, i178.
28. See note 4 supra.
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preceding June.29 The decision had found the defendants guilty of illegal
restraints upon competition at the distribution and exhibition levels only,
dismissing the complaint as to the production level of the industry.30 The
evidence did not disclose specific agreement, conspiracy, or combination in
restraint of trade, except as to the pooling of theatres.31 It is only in
the historical development of the distribution pattern, the uniformity of
action under it, and the common maintainance of it that the court could
find any concert of action.3 2  Earlier decisions within the industry offer
ample precedent for granting relief on this finding, for the Supreme Court
has held that a combination or combined action is not required. It is suffi-
cient if the defendants know of the plan and act in accordance with it."
The existence of eight major companies competing in production and
distribution, and of the large number of independent theatre owners, should
be evidence enough that monopoly does not exist in the industry. Nor is
there any evidence that any one company has had monopolistic intentions.3 4
But it should be readily apparent that the control over the industry exercised
by the eight major distributors, and by the Big Five in particular, regardless
of combination or conspiracy among them, has resulted at least in oligopoly.
The court recognized that this control resulted in price-fixing,3 5 in an
illegal clearance pattern,38 and in other illegal restraints imposed as a
result of the distribution system. It did not, however, treat the Big Five
collectively on the exhibition level to establish the existence of a monopoly
that would justify divestiture. It merely restrained illegal practices on
that level.
3 7
In private actions under the anti-trust laws the courts have some-
times refused relief because sufficient proof of combination in restraint of
trade was lacking.8s The Paramount decision will overcome much of this
difficulty. The defendant companies having been found guilty of restraint
of trade, any exhibitor who can show damage resulting from the illegal
practices of the distribution pattern can present a prima facie case against
them for triple damages. 9 The necessity of proving damages, however,
will continue to make enforcement by private action difficult.40
29. The decree provided for a more or less optional plan of competitive bidding in
place of the mandatory system proposed by the decision. The decision contained a
list of specific factors to be considered in evaluating specific clearance terms. This list
is omitted from the decree. The decision announced a continuation of the arbitration
system of the consent decree. The decree terminates that arbitration system.
30. See note 4 supra, § i of the decree.
31. See note 3 supra at 350-352.
32. Id. at 340.
33. Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U. S. 208 (1939).
34. See note 3 srupra at 354.
35. Id. at 340.
36. Id. at 343.
37. Id. at 354.
38. Gary Theatre v. Columbia, 12o F. (2d) 891 (C. C. A. 7th, I94i); Westway
Theatre, Inc. v. 2oth Century-Fox, 30 F. Supp. 830 (D. Md. 1940), aff'd, 113 F. (2d)
932 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940).
39. 38 STAT. 731 (1894), I U. S. C. A. § 16 (194).
4o. Two recent cases have awarded treble damages to exhibitors injured by the
distribution pattern, and have established precedent for this type of suit. Bigelow v.
RKO, I5O F. (2d) 877 (C. C. A. 7th, 1945), rev'd, 327 U. S. 251 (1946), 94 U.
OF PA. L. Ray. 425, found that the Chicago system of clearance was illegal. But the
Circuit Court, claiming that there was no proof of certain damages, denied relief not-
withstanding the verdict. The Supreme Court, however, upheld the triple damages
award of the district court and set a new and liberal standard for the determination of
damages, awarding relief based upon a comparison of past earnings with earnings
under the illegal practice. Id. at 264. See Reich, The Entertainment Industry and
Partial Divestiture: The provisions of the decree relating to theatre
ownership by the defendants should accomplish the untangling of the com-
plicated ownership structure on the exhibition level, and Big Five control
should thereby be reduced to its minimum short of complete divestiture.
However, the decree does not fulfill the request of the government that
exhibition be divorced from distribution, and therefore the motivating factor
of the present distribution pattern remains untouched.
Pooling agreements are terminated; 1 agreements not to compete,
and theatre leases on a profit-sharing basis are prohibited,42 thus destroy-
ing the many operational partnerships between Big Five exhibitors and
independent exhibitors. But there will be complications. Pooling agree-
ments have usually preferred the theatre owned by the major distributor.
Theatres participating in the pool and owned by independents have played
second or subsequent runs. Many such theatres have been closed or
allowed to deteriorate.43  The sudden dissolution of the pooling arrange-
ments may therefore cause greater damage to the independent participants
than to the Big Five. Complaints of resulting financial injury, however,
should not be allowed to interfere with the dissolution of the pools.
Actual joint ownership by the Big Five, either with other defendants
or with independents, is also enjoined, regardless of whether such owner-
ship is in fee or in stock. Joint interests of two or more defendants, or
joint ownership with an independent of more than 5% and less than
95% must be terminated within two years. In complying with this re-
quirement the defendants may not increase any theatre interest except
upon showing to the satisfaction of the court that such acquisition will
not result in restraint of competition.4 4  This partial divestiture completes
the destruction of the exhibition partnerships of the Big Five. There is
ample precedent for these provisions in recent decrees41 where similar
action was taken against restraint of competition by independent chains.
the Federal A4nti-Trust Law (1946) 20 So. CALIF. L. REV. I, 13-16. In Goldman v.
Loew's, I5O F. (2d) 738 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1945), a simlar judgment was awarded, but
here the question of actual damages was more readily proved, for the plaintiff's
theatre had not been able to operate because of defendant's refusal to license films to
it. While private actions may increase in importance as a result of the Bigelow and
Goldman cases, such actions cannot remedy the basic problems found in the integra-
tion of distribution and exhibition, and in the industry wide pattern of distribution. See
Note (1946) 13 U. OF Cnl. L. REv. 346, 349.
41. See note 4 supra, § II, (2) of the decree.
42. Id. § III, (3) and (4).
43. 165 VARIETY No. 5, Jan. 8, 1947, p. 33, c. 5.
44. See note 4 supra, § III, (5) of the decree.
45. In United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173 (1944), the Su-
preme Court upheld injunctions against a group of exhibitors who had combined in
restraint of competition. The decree prohibited franchise licensing of films for circuit
theatres in competition with independent exhibitors, and ordered the defendant circuits
to divest themselves of the ownership of corporate stock of other defendant exhibitor
corporations. In United States v. Schine Chain, 63 F. Supp. 229 (W. D. N. Y. 1945),
now before the Supreme Court, the government won a similar decree. The de-
fendant chain was- enjoined from monopolizing the supply of first and second runs,
from demanding or receiving unreasonable clearance, from conditioning the licensing
of films for any one theatre upon licensing for the circuit, from enforcing agreements
not to compete or restricing the use of theatre property, from selling or buying theatre
interests without court approval, and from continuing the conspiracy in restraint of
trade. As in the Crescent case the court directed divestiture of the illegal combination,
ordering that the defendants and their affiliates dissolve in order to restore fair com-
petition. In a third case against a major exhibitor chain, United States v. Griffith
Amusement Co., 68 F. Supp. i8o (D. Okla. 1946), on facts similar to the Schine case,
the trial court found no conspiracy or combination and refused the prayer of the gov-
ernment for an injunction.
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Future expansion by the Big Five is prohibited by a further pro-
vision forbidding future theatre acquisitions.4 6 With the lifting of the
war-time construction regulations, this should permit independent exhibitors
to build new theatres and provide competition to the Big Five in many
areas where they are now unopposed. This factor alone might well
result in a complete change in the competitive structure over the next
ten years.
Additional provisions of the decree limit exhibition activities of the
Big Five by prohibiting the licensing of films through agents who also
buy for other exlibitors, 47 and by enjoining franchise, formula deal, and
master agreement licensing.48  Big Five theatres are thus denied many
advantages they have previously used to maintain their favored position.
Competitive Bidding: All eight defendants are affected by .the pro-
visions of the decree relating to the distribution level. The competitive
bidding requirement 49 is the basic element of the court's remedy. It is
not merely a negative provision forbidding illegal licensing practices; it
is an affirmative regulation providing a specific system for the licensing
of features. The provision directs that each feature released for public
exhibition in any competitive area shall be offered to every exhibitor who
desires to exhibit it on some run other than that upon which the feature
is to be exhibited in a theatre owned by the distributor. Licenses are to be
granted solely on the basis of merit. Status as an old customer, former
position in the industry, or affiliation is not to be considered. Each license
shall be offered and taken tiieatre by theatre and picture by picture.
When a run is to be offered excluding simultaneous exhibition in
competing theatres, the distributor must notify all exhibitors in the com-
petitive area thirty days in advance of the date when bids are to be re-
ceived. The runs upon which the picture is to be offered must be stated
and the offer must include a minimum flat rental figure for a specified
length of run. The date the picture will be available, the clearance to be
offered, etc., must be stated. The exhibitor must bid within 15 days after
receiving the notice. His bid must state the run for which he is bidding,
the clearance he expects, the time and the date, and, of course, the offer
of rental, either on a flat rental basis, on a percentage of the gross re-
ceipts, or any other form of rental. The distributor may reject all offers,
but in the event of the acceptance of any offer, the distributor must grant
the license to the highest responsible bidder, having a theatre of size, loca-
tion and equipment capable of yielding a reasonable return to the licensor.
Because of the intervening objections of the parties and of amici curiae
to the mandatory system of competitive bidding proposed in the June de-
cision, the decree provides that competitive bidding shall not be required
where there is no competition among theatres for the different runs, or
where there is no offer made by an exhibitor within the 15 day period. It
it is unlikely that there will be many of the latter class. There is always
some one person willing to take a chance to better his position, and if one
bid is received, the licensing must be on a competitive basis.
The decree limits the present concept of competitive area by de-
fining it as the territory occupied by more than one theatre in which it
may reasonably be said that such theatres compete with each other for
46. See note 4 s=pra, § III, (6) of the decree.
47. Id. §111, (7).
48. Id. §III, (i).
49. Id. §11, (8).
the exhibition of films on any run. This should restrict the size of the
present clearance zones.
The announced aim of competitive bidding is to introduce competi-
tion into the present distribution pattern. But it does so by forcing the
exhibitors to compete with each other for the product of the defendants.
There is a shortage of films and a surplus of theatres. In order to get
the necessary features, theatres will have to outbid their competitors. In
the ordinary situation where the demand is greater than the supply, the
price goes up. That result should be expected when the decree goes
into effect.
The real difficulty has been the lack of competition between exhibitors
for the patron's dollar (a level which is not directly affected by com-
petitive bidding) and the lack of competition between the distributors
for the exhibitor's trade (competition into which they have not been
forced to enter because of the existing shortage of the product). To
remedy the lack of competition on these two levels, the court has pro-
posed to establish competition on another level, competition among ex-
hibitors for the distributors' product. If the remedy could be found in
merely directing that there will be competition, it would seem more logi-
cal to require the distributors to compete for playing time in each theatre,
and allowing the exhibitor to accept the license of the distributor who
makes the lowest offer. Such a suggestion is, of course, not practicable,
for it would tend to extend, rather than to limit, the defendant's control
of exhibition; but it would at least place the burden of competition where
it belongs. And it would be more likely to lower the price of admission.
The practical aspects of competitive bidding may also be questioned.
Who is to determine which of a group of bids represents the highest
responsible bidder? No two exhibitors are likely to make the same bid as
to dates, clearance, method of fixing the rental, etc. Can bids containing
such diverse factors be readily compared? Can a flat rental bid be com-
pared with a percentage bid? Can the value of any percentage bid be
determined unless the admission price is fixed by the license? If these
decisions are left entirely to the distributor, the situation will be no dif-
ferent than at present.
Opposition of exhibitors to the bidding system has been unanimous. 50
In order to assure product for continuous operation, the exhibitor will
have to make bids on many more features than he needs. If he bids on
just one film, and his competitor outbids him, he is without film. If
he bids on two or three, and is successful in all, he has more film than
he can use. Moreover, he will not be able to arrange his program to
vary the type of entertainment offered. He will find it necessary to
take what he can get.
There is a limit to what any theatre can bid for a feature without
raising its admission price. Size, location, and present theatre-going
habits will play a large part in determining what each theatre can afford.
Exhibitors may find they must make the choice between raising prices
in order to obtain a better position or accepting the lesser runs and
poorer films. Neither possibility guarantees any advantage to the pub-
lic. Moreover, competitive bidding will increase the bargaining power
of the Big Five, who go into any competitive situation with a backlog
5o. Argument of Mr. Thurman Arnold, counsel for the American Theatre Ass'n.,
an organization of independent exhibitors, United States v. Paramount Pictures (S. D.
N. Y.), Equity No. 87-273, Stenographer's Minutes, Oct. 22, 1946, p. 3899.
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of their own films for which they need not compete. With that reserve, they
can afford to outbid independent exhibitors to retain their preferred position.
On the other hand, competitive bidding offers possibilities of break-
ing down the pattern of the industry by shaking the preferred status of
the present first-run theatres.51  The picture by picture and theatre by
theatre requirement overcomes many of the advantages of chain opera-
tion and allows opportunity for all competitors to compete for the pre-
ferred runs.
A further provision guarantees fhat an exhibitor equipped to com-
pete will not arbitrarily be denied the license privilege. 52  New compe-
tition cannot be kept out of the competitive area. Situations like that
of the Goldvan case will not develop.
The possibilities of flat-rental-licensing should also be noted. The
distributor must specify a flat rental minimum. Exhibitors may submit
flat rental bids. Such licensing would cure many of the ills of the indus-
try. It would take the distributors out of their percentage-partnerships
yvith the exhibitors. It would remove the temptation to control prices
generally. It would allow exhibitors an opportunity to experiment with
admission price. It would abolish all of the scouting techniques now em-
ployed by the distributors to check the admission figures of the ex-
hibitors. After some time for experimentation a general shift to the
flat-rental-licensing of films might provide satisfactory returns for the dis-
tributor, greater freedom and higher profits for many exhibitors, and pro-
tection for the public in the form of free competition in admission prices.
Nevertheless, the court has not enjoined percentage licensing or required
mandatory flat-rental-licensing. It leaves the parties free to establish
whatever rental basis they desire, providing price-fixing is not practiced.55
Other Provisions Affecting Distribution: The fixing of minimum ad-
mission prices by license agreement in any manner or form is enjoined.54
The distributor will have no discretion whatsoever relating to the ad-
mission price in the independent theatre to which its films are licensed.
Nor is the exhibitor permitted to include the admission price in the license
contract, for the parties are forbidden to fix the minimum price in the
license. Indirect price-fixing, whereby the distributor requires the ex-
hibitor to fix a specific minimum price as a condition of the license
(arguing that such requirement is for the purpose of determining the
bid, or for determining reasonable clearance) is thereby prevented. This
very feature, however, may lead to difficulty in determining which of
several competitors has made the best bid for a particular film, but a less
definite provision would not provide the same complete remedy.
The decree contains no exception permitting films to be licensed as
a road-showi5 a practice depending upon price-fixing as its essential ele-
ment. The eight major distributors are thus denied the use of this de-
vice. The decree is not binding upon those minor produceis and dis-
tributors who are not parties to the present action, however, and they
are therefore free to use the road-show as they see fit. A separate suit
51. See Note (1946) 13 U. oF CHr. L. REV. 346, 359.
52. See note 4 supra, § II, g of the decree.
53. See note 3 supra at 340.
54. See note 4 supra, § II, i of the decree.
55. "Road-Show-a public exhibition of a motion picture in a limited number of
theatres, in advance of its general release, at admission prices higher than those cus-
tomarily charged in first-run theatres in the areas where they are located." See note
3 supra at 333.
would be necessary to bring these other distributors within the ban. The
eight defendants may have cause to complain that to forbid them to
use a device which remains available to their minor competitors unfairly
discriminates against them. Any corrective action, however, should be
directed toward preventing road-shows by other distributors, rather than
toward making an exception in favor of the present defendants.
The clearance provisions of the decree present questions similar to
those posed by competitive bidding. The defendants are enjoined from
agreeing among themselves or with other exhibitors or distributors to
maintain a system of clearances, from granting clearances between theatres
not in substantial competition, or from granting clearance in excess of
what is reasonably necessary to protect the licensee of the run so granted.56
Questions involving substantial competition seem inevitable. When theatres
A and B are in competition, and theatres B and C are in competition, but
A and C are not in competition, any clearance granted to A over B will
necessarily affect B's ability to compete with C. Is such a situation cov-
ered by substantial competition? Or can it be said whether metropolitan
down-town theatres are in substantial competition with neighborhood
theatres in the suburbs?
Other questions arise involving reasonable clearance. How much
protection does a run require? Is it possible to fix a reasonable clearance
without knowing the price at which the picture will be shown? Can a
licensee be protected without specifying a minimum price below which
subsequent runs cannot be shown? If there are no answers to questions
raised by reasonable clearance, it may be appropriate to raise the question
whether any clearance is reasonable. A provision forbidding clearance
entirely would certainly be easier to enforce, and it is to be doubted if
any other provision will completely terminate the use of clearance in
restraint of competition. Under the decree, however, the burden in
any legal action based upon clearance is upon the distributor to prove
that the clearance which has been granted is within the requirements of
the decree.5 7 This provision, if none other, guarantees some restriction
upon the granting of clearance. The difficulty of proof of such elusive
questions may well provide some measure of effectiveness. There thus
may be strength in the very weakness of the provision.
But any provisions that permit the clearance period to be varied
from theatre to theatre will inevitably lead to unfair discrimination against
weaker theatres unable to command the same protection awarded to
more powerful competitors. Some further protection should be pro-
vided. A more objective basis less open to discrimination, might well
have been established.
Standard clearance periods, automatically awarded with each suc-
ceeding run, would afford protection to prior exhibitors without permitting
discrimination. Depending upon the size and needs of the competitive
area standard clearances could undoubtedly be worked out. The first-
run of a film might automatically carry with it a two-week clearance
within that area. The second-run might carry a one-week clearance, etc.
But only if the clearance periods are standard for specific runs will dis-
crimination and the possibility of unfair competition through clearance
be completely eliminated. In any event, the system of clearances should
not be permitted to maintain the present stratification of the industry. 58
56. See note 4 supra, § II, 2, 3 and 4 of the decree.
57. Id. § II, 4.
58. See Note (1946) 13 U. Or CnI. L. REv. 346, 354.
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The decree provides that the licensee's right to exhibit a particular
feature shall not be conditioned upon the licensing of any other feature.
59
All block-booking of features is thereby prohibited. No mention is made
of conditioning features upon the sale of short-subjects or newsreels, how-
ever, nor is there any restriction at all upon the block-booking and blind-
selling of this latter class of films. The necessity for selling these types
under the requirements for licensing feature films would prove burden-
some, and they have been properly omitted from the decree. While block-
booking of features is forbidden, there is nothing in the decree prevent-
ing the group-licensing of features, provided each feature in the group
has been purchased on a picture by picture basis as required by the com-
petitive bidding provision.
The competitive bidding requirement, however, makes all but im-
possible any group-licensing of films by an exhibitor operating in a com-
petitive situation. The exhibitor who has no competition, or whose com-
petitors do not care to compete for the features of a particular distributor,
may license a group of features without difficulty. Any such licensee
must be given the right to reject 2o% of any features so licensed before
being trade shown, provided this option is exercised within ten days
after there has been an opportunity to inspect the film. The evils of
blind-selling have thereby been eliminated. The picture by picture
licensing of competitive bidding overcomes the danger of using group
licensing to discriminate against a competitor by over-buying. All of the
abuses of block-booking have been eliminated, a certain degree of security
has been retained (for the exhibitor who has no competition at least),
and it would seem that a fair solution has been reached to this phase of
the problem.
Just as the defendants as exhibitors were enjoined from continuing
any franchises, formula deals, or master agreements, so also as distributors
they are forbidden to further make or perform any such licensing agree-
ments with exhibitors. 0 This provision will nullify the superior bargain-
ing position attained by chains of theatres over smaller competitors. Com-
bined with the competitive bidding provision this will result in the licens-
ing of films to all exhibitors, regardless of size or position, solely on the
basis of what each theatre is able to offer for the license privilege. But
nothing contained in the decree affects the right of any distributor-ex-
hibitor to exhibit its own films in its own theatres upon its own terms
or conditions.,'
AN EVALUATION
The decree presents problems of enforcement for which no solution
has been provided. It would have been better perhaps had the court
merely placed restrictions upon the illegal practices of distribution and
exhibition, permitting the industry to reorganize itself within the law.
Courts should not attempt to perform functions which are legislative or
administrative in character; they have neither the machinery, nor the
time. Yet the competitive bidding and clearance provisions of the decree
will require some sort of supervision if the decree is to be properly en-
forced. In the absence of such machinery, there will be either no en-
59. See note 4 supra, § II, 7 of the decree.
6o. Id. § II, 5 and. 6.
61. Id. § IV. This has led several Distributors to lease first-run theatres for
the run of particular film-thus making the theatres their own and allowing the fixing
of advanced prices for road-show purposes.
forcement at all, or at best there will be enforcement only at the expense
of the exhibitor, who has not been a party to the Paramount case and on
whom the burden should not fall. Moreover, court action is too expen-
sive to afford protection to those weaker exhibitors who will need pro-
tection most.
The court has recognized the need for extra-judcial enforcement
machinery. The June opinion indicated that the arbitration system es-
tablished in the industry by the 194o consent decree would be continued,
2
but due to the unwillingness of all of the parties to consent to a system
of arbitration, the court found it necessary to terminate its operation.63
It did so, however, only \vith a strong recommendation that the system
be continued by the defendants. 64
It has been argued that arbitration can not of itself afford an effec-
tive remedy for the enforcement of the anti-trust laws,65 that it too easily
lends itself to shielding actual violations from the scrutiny of the courts,66
and that the arbitration ruling itself may violate the rights of others not
party to the arbitration.6 7 Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the remedy pro-
vided by the decree will prove effectihe unless some such enforcement
machinery is available.
The anti-trust laws provide only that where illegal restraints are
found to exist the courts shall have the duty to enjoin and eliminate them.
There is no legislative authorization for experimentation, for the organi-
zation of a particular competitive structure by the courts, or for the re-
tention of any restraints upon competition which may seem to be con-
venient. If the industry can function only by restraining free competition,
or if it requires some special organization in the interest of the public, then
it is a legislative function to remove the industry from the operation of
the anti-trust laws, to provide special regulations for it as for a public
utility, or to provide for its administration by a special agency, as has been
done in the radio industry through the Federal Communications Commis-
sion. It may well be that the problems of clearance and run for example
can be solved only by an administrative agency. Perhaps,
". .. a National Board of Zoning, Clearance, and Protection with
regional offices throughout the United States might well be set up
with a carefully chosen membership so that various delicate problems
presented in a very complicated industry could be given proper con-
sideration." 68
But more drastic negative remedies, applied by the court, could bring the
industry within the anti-trust laws without recourse to legislative action.
62. See note 3 supra at 357. For a description and evaluation of arbitration under
the consent decree see Note (941) 50 YALE L. J. 854, 870. And see also Quarterly
Reports of the Motion. Picture Arbitration Tribunals (I94I) 5 AR. J. 185, 286; (i942)
6 AB. J. 153, 269.
63. See note 4 supra, § V of the decree.
64. Id. See memorandum entered with the decree.
65. See Kronstein, Business Arbitration--Istrument of Private Government
(944) 54 YALE L. J. 36.
66. See Note (x946) 13 U. oF CHI. L. REv. 346, 352.
67. An action by an exhibitor to enjoin arbitration on clearance between a com-
petitor exhibitor and a distributor was reluctantly dismissed by the court, holding that
the court which approved the consent decree was not without authority to provide for
the submission of disputes to arbitration. St. Louis Amusement Co. v. Paramount
Pictures, 6i F. Supp. 854, 858 (E. D. Mo. 1945).
68. A solution suggested by Picard, J., in Mid-West Theatres Co. v. Co-operative
Theatres of Mich., 43 F. Supp. 216, 225 (E. D. Mich. 1941).
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Divestiture: In both the original action in 1938 and in the present
action, the government has asked for the divorcement of production and
distribution from exhibition on the ground that theatre ownership and
management by the Big Five is at the heart of the illegal distribution pat-
tern of the industry. Although this contention is supported by an anal-
ysis of the distribution practices, their purpose, and their effect, the court
has attempted to provide a solution without ordering divestiture.6 9
Since the theatre interests of the distributors have been the directing
influence in the development of illegal distribution practices, it may well
be questioned whether the illegal restraints upon competition within the
industry can really be controlled without removing their cause.70 Cer-
tainly divestiture seems to be the only solution consistent with the gov-
ernment's claims of fact, claims which are largely sustained by the court's
decision. No other simple order by the court could of itself affect as
much in overcoming the illegal practices as could a provision ordering
divestiture.
In North Dakota, at least, theatre ownership by the distributors has
been regarded as against public inierest. A statute of that state forbidding
producer-distributor ownership or control of theatres was held to be
constitutional in a case before a federal district court in 1938.71 If the
Big Five through their vertical organizations can increase the efficiency of
the industry and pass that efficiency on to the public, then public policy
should favor their continued theatre ownership and operation. The record,
however, does not show that the public has benefited thereby; for the
cost of motion picture entertainment in their theatres is the highest in
the industry.
Restriction on Cross-Licensing: As a secondary remedy, the govern-
ment urged that if the distributors were to be permitted to keep their
theatre holdings, an injunction should be granted forbidding the licensing
of films by one distributor-exhibitor for exhibition in the theatres of an-
other. This restraint upon cross-licensing, it was argued, is the only
provision short of divestiture which gives any hope of supplying the addi-
tional independent exhibition outlets which are essential to overcome the
existing pattern.72  Since the Big Five go into any competitive situation
with the backlog of their own films for exhibition, they are therefore in
a better competitive position to bargain for the films of others because
their needs are less. Moreover, if one of the Big Five knows that its
films will be shown in the theatres of another of the Big Five, it will
be more likely to favor the films of that distributor by giving them
better playing time in its theatres, etc., thus discriminating against the
films of other distributors.
The Big Five insist that this restriction would only be another way
of bringing about divestiture. It cannot be doubted that many of the
second-run theatres, and even many of their first-run theatres in smaller
communities, would have difficulty finding sufficient films to meet their
needs. But with the independent production of film on the increase, it
might be expected that after a brief period for adjustment, this difficulty
69. See note 3 supra at 353-357.
70. See Note (1946) 13 U. OF Cr. L. RM-. 346, 356-357.
71. Paramount Pictures v. Langer, 23 F. Supp. 89o (D. N. D. 1938), 52 HARV. L.
REv. 171, (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 339, reversed 3o6 U. S. 61_ (1938) (moot question).
72. Argument of Mr. Robert L. Wright, Special Assistant to the Attorney Gen-
eral. United States v. Paramount Pictures (S. D. N. Y.), Equity 87-273, Stenog-
rapher's Minutes, Oct. 22, 1946, p. 3889.
could be overcome.7 3 This facilitating of outlets for the product of inde-
pendent producers (and of the Little Three who would not be affected by
the provision) would certainly increase competition in the industry, and
in this respect another argument for restricting cross-licensing is presented.
But the injunction would also in a sense restrict competition, for it would
prevent the Big Five from competing for a large part of the film product.
On the other hand, it would place the entire vertical structure of each
of the Big Five in competition with others of the Big Five. This too
should be beneficial. It provides the possibility of price competition be-
tveen Big Five films at the box office. Under the present structure, com-
petition has been largely on the basis of quality and popularity, for the
Big Five have shared the profits of exhibition through the percentage
licensing of films to one anothdr's theatres.
The cross-licensing injunction is not in itself enough to insure the
cessation of the present illegal pattern. Other provisions would be needed
to supplement it, just as other provisions would be needed to supplement
divestiture. Under either provision, however, the need for enforcement
procedure would be greatly reduced, and competitive bidding would be
completely unnecessary.
Conclusion
The decree of the statutory court is not likely to provide a permanent
solution to the problems of the industry. It succeeds where it prohibits
practices that have resulted in restraint of trade, and where it untangles
the ownership-management structure at the top of the exhibitor level. But
it retains the basic structure of the industry and provides a too-compli-
cated regulative remedy with no adequate machinery for enforcement. It
should not be expected that the industry can be restored to a permanent
and self-enforcing competitive basis without divestiture, or at the very
least without prohibiting the cross-licensing of feature films by distributor-
exhibitors. The propensity for discrimination of clearance is not likely to
be overcome by any regulation short of termination of all clearance. At
least some standard provision that would avoid the uncertainties and dis-
putes of reasonable clearance should be evolved. Nor should it be ex-
pected that a device as complicated and as uncertain as competitive bidding
will prove to be a satisfactory substitute for more definitive remedies.
Judicial regulation is not likely to provide a panacea.
J. F. Z., III.
73. A restriction on cross-licensing might be worked out, allowing sufficient time
for adjustment, so that Big Five theatres would not suddenly be denied product and
making an exception of the one-theatre town. Another exception might provide for the
situation where there are not enough independently operated theatres to show the
product of those of the Big Five which do not have their own theatres in the particular
competitive area.
1947] NOTE
